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Human factors and system safety engineering
concepts frequently have not been incorporated in the
design of D. S. Navy aircraft cockpits. The
relationship of human factors cockpit deficiencies to
pilot error and operator inefficiency is examined and
the need for a comprehensive data base of these
deficiencies is demonstrated. A questionnaire was
designed and developed to collect the required data
from the operators of naval aircraft. Results from
administering the questionnaire to a number of
subjects substantiate the validity of the method for
gathering the human factors cockpit deficiency data.
Recommendations are made for expanding the data
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I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of the inclusion of Human Factors
Engineering in the design of Naval systems has been
recognized for some time, and in 1968, MIL-H-46855, Human
Engineering Requirements for Military Systems, Equipment,
and Facilities, was published, thus formalizing anew this
importance. Concurrently, MIL-STD-1 472 , Human Engineering
Design Criteria for Military Systems, Equipment, and
Facilities, was published. MIL-STD- 1472 established the
criteria for and MTL-K-46855 mandated the application of
human engineering to Navy systems acquisitions. Similarly,
MIL-STD-882, System Safety Program for Systems and
Associated Subsystems and Equipment, established the
requirements and mandated the application of system safety
to Navy acgisitions. Since their promulgation, these
publications have beer superseded by updated versions and it
appears that human engineering requirements and design
criteria are continually being strengthened. Yet Casey and
Sturm (1974), after documenting the existence of the formal
requirement for designing human engineering into Navy
systems, presented prominent examples of human engineering
deficiencies in recent weapon systems acquisitions. Among
the systems identified as having human engineering
deficiencies was the F- 1 4 fighter bomber. One conclusion
which emerged from the study was that inadequate human
engineering in Navy systems acquisitions is a problem that
has not been solved (Casey and Sturm, 1974) . Incorporation
of system safety into acquisitions is another problem which
also remains to be solved. It is the authors contention
that the failure to properly design human engineering into
the systems at the design stage, while partly a by-product

of the acquisition process, is due in great measure to the
fact that design personnel are not sufficiently aware of the
environment for which they are designing and that
insufficient knowledge exists of the operational environment
and the complex man-machine interactions of that
environment.
One of the more important areas adversely affected by
the inadequate human engineering effort has been that of
aircraft cockpit design. Daniels (1976) , in a study of U. S.
Navy aircraft cockpit deficiencies, concluded that there are
substantial numbers of man-machine interface problems in
naval aircraft cockpits. Schobert (1976) , in a follow-up
study, concluded that:
"The cockpit design deficiency structure demonstrated
that an identifiable body of common cause factors exists
across a large number of different aircraft."
Table I of Schobert's study reveals that 137 respondents
to an open question as to the presence of design
deficiencies in the aircraft they flew, were able to
generate 286 discrepancies distributed over 26 aircraft
types. That table is included herein as Table I of this
paper. Table II of that same study shows the results of
categorization of those cockpit design deficiencies by
deficiency type. This table is included as Table II. The
most significant aspects of the information contained in
those tables are not the numbers involved nor the diversity
of the deficiencies. More noteworthy is the information
that, (1) All aircraft in the Navy inventory, from the near
obsolete to the most modern, have some human factors cockpit
deficiencies; and, (2) Since the critical incident technique
was used to gather the data, yardsticks established by
Flanagan (1962) suggest that the type and variety of
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responses indicate many more deficiences have yet to be
identified. Daniels (1976) suggested that every aircraft
type acquired gets to the fleet with a number of "less than
urgent" human engineering problems, that in many cases the
deficiencies last throughout the life span of the aircraft,
and that there is a carryover of similar deficiencies
between types and generations of aircraft. He states
furtner that
"The continuation of many of these deficiencies
(circuit breaker panels, scan patterns, inability to
reach or see) from one generation to the next leads to
the conclusion that
a. the Navy does not recognize these deficiencies,
or
b. does not consider them important, or
c. has not devised a suitable means of systematic-
ally ensuring that new cockpits do not repeat
the same deficiencies of older aircraft."
Daniels (1976)
It is a basic tenet of the Human Factors Engineering
discipline that when human engineering design deficiencies
are present, the efficiency of the system suffers. The way
in which human inefficiency is indicated is through errors
and time (delays) (Meister, 1971) . Thus, human engineering
deficiencies in the design of individual system components
or in their interactions with one another, promote both
inefficiency and unsafe conditions because the system is
predisposed to the operator making an error or being
delayed. It follows that the many cockpit deficiencies in
13

naval aircraft promote errors on the part of the men who fly
them and this in turn degrades mission effectiveness and
contributes adversely to the overall Naval Aviation accident
rate.
Naval Aviators and Naval Flight Of ficers (NFO' s) who fly
the Navy's aircraft are often pushed to their absolute
physical and mental limits by the demands imposed by today's
operating environment. Not only are the aircraft and
missions more demanding and complex, but lack of funds often
limits flight time (and proficiency) to less than optimal
levels. With the addition of fatigue, adverse weather,
psychological factors, hectic operations and other
unforeseen factors, the man flying the aircraft stands a
better chance than ever of becoming overloaded. With
challenges such as these facing him, the aviator or NFC can
well do without nuaan factors design deficiencies. It is
therefore absolutely necessary, both from the standpoint of
increasing nission effectiveness and safety of flight, that
all present human factors cockpit deficiencies be
identified, categorized, and corrected as soon as possible.
A cockpit human factors engineering deficiencies data
base, once established, would be invaluable to the Naval
Aviation Safety Program. Such a data base could be used for
categorizing and ferreting out potential accident inducing
factors in individual aircraft types as well as in Naval
Aviation as a whole. It would also have application to the
area of design, in that data base analyses could be used to




A. DESIGN ERRORS AND THE HUMAN OPERATOR
Design errors are manifested in improperly designed
equipment, in failure to assign effective roles to equipment
and personnel, and in failure to meet system requirements
(Meister, 1971) . This thesis concentrates primarily on the
aspect of improperly designed equipment. It must be clearly
understood at this point that equipment improperly designed
from the human engineering standpoint does, in fact,
increase the error potential of the equipment operator.
Chapanis (1965) suggested this when he wrote
"Human factors engineers are the first to grant that
people make mistakes. But they raise these important
questions also: Is some of the blame to be found in the
design cf the equipment that people use? Do people make
more mistakes with some kinds of equipment or vehicles
than others? Is it possible to redesign machines so
that human errors are reduced or even eliminated?
Research over the past few decades provides us with a
resounding 'Yes' to all these questions" Chapanis (1 965)
Errors can take many forms and be classified many
different ways. .leister ( 1 97 1 ) has stated
"The error may reveal itself as
15

(a) a failure to perform a required action - that is,
an error of omission;
(b) the performance of that action in an incorrect
manner - that is, an error of commission; or
(c) its performance out of sequence or at an
incorrect time."
Of course cockpit design deficiencies promote error just
as any other equipment improperly designed for human use,
but this type of error is known in aviation circles as
"pilot. error". Pilot error includes the error types
classified above by Meister as well as non-human engineering
related error such as that of poor judgement. According to
Maxwell and Stucki (1975) , pilot error has been considered
for many years as the single largest cause of aircraft
accidents. Ricketson, Kennamore, and Callen(1975) provide a
functional definition of pilot (human) error and its causal
elements which clarifies the meaning of the expression.
(see Figure 1) Items one through eight identify basic
environmental elements which influence the aviation system
and are potentially error producing. Item two is given
added emphasis in Figure 1 since it represents the focus of
this paper. When any of the eight elements, singly cr in
combination, require attention or response from the pilot
beyond his capacity to respond, he enters an overload
condition which can culminate in an error. As a result of





















































































B. HUMAN FACTORS AND NAVAL AVIATION
To a large extent technology has outpaced the much
needed consideration of human beings in system design. Each
generation of sophistication has increased the potential for
man's being placed in a position of sensory or mental
overload. This applies especially to the field of aviation
and specifically to the design of cockpits from which man
must control increasingly complex aircraft and associated
systems. In particular, it appears that the human aspect of
system performance is not being sufficiently considered at
the operational level. An Air Line Pilots Association human
factors spokesman, after noting that the airline industry
suffers severely from the lack of application of the
principles of human engineering, stated
"All aircraft manufacturers I have dealt with have human
engineering expertise in their organization. The often
compromised effectiveness of the human engineering group
in design and manufacture deoends to a great extent on
individual persuasiveness and corporate philosophy.
Once the aircraft leaves the plant, sc also are left
behind the human enaineers. Almost without exception,
the companies who" operate aircraft and the government
authority under which the aircraft is certified and
supervised lack human engineering expertise. The number
of the changes an aircraft underdoes in retrofitted
equipment, revised procedures 'and new operating
conditions all take place without the benefit of trained
human factors personnel." Stone (1975)
The author considers the above to also be true for Naval
Aviation but to a much greater extent. There are very few
human factors specialists in the Navy today and virtually
none of these personnel are engaged in work in the
operational arena. The typical Naval Aviator's operational
environment is one of the more demanding in the Navy today.
Not only does he fly complex, high performance aircraft but
he does sc on varied missions and under all types of weather
18

conditions. Equipment that may not have been particularly
well designed in the first place is retrofitted, additional
missions are assigned to aircraft, procedures change, and
operating conditions vary, just as is cited above by Stone,
and this also without the benefit of inputs from trained
human factors personnel.
Naval Aviation, in the absense of trained human factors
engineering personnel who fully understood the operational
environment, has not in the past had a program for
identifying and eliminating or decreasing the effects of
human factors cockpit deficiencies. Although reports of
design deficiencies submitted by fleet units have been the
basis for past cockpit modifications, all too often the
deficiencies are accepted as an unchangeable fact of life
and ways are found to circumvent the problem. A major
problem in identifying deficiencies is the fact that often
consensus cannot be reached on the degree of severity of a
particular problem by the men who fly the aircraft.
The Navy has had for many years an aircraft accident and
serious incident reporting procedure which has had very
limited success in identifying cockpit human factors
deficiencies. This procedure is promulgated by OPNAVINST
3750. 6 (series) . Under the procedure all aircraft accidents
and serious incidents involving naval aircraft are to be
reported with investigative comments to the Naval Safety
Center within specified time limits. The accident reporting
procedures are basically sound, are of no consequence to
this paper, and will not be discussed further. This is not
so for incident reporting. Far more incidents and
near-accidents occur than accidents and unless the
circumstances surrounding and causing them are identified
and corrected, there is a very good chance of their
diasterous reoccurrance. In theory, when an aviator has an
accident, near accident, makes a serious error, or in
19

general gets himself into a precarious situation either
because of human error, equipment malfunction, or material
failure, the facts are reported to the Naval Safety Center
for inclusion in their master data bank. In practice,
material failures and equipment malfunctions make up the
majority of the incident reports. There are a number of
reasons for this, the foremost being:
1. The Naval Aviator and NFO are very proud and
competitive individuals who dislike admitting errors.
When errors are made the tendency is to be close mouthed
about it and try not to let it. happen again.
2. There is keen competition among these men to remain
promotatle within the Navy rank structure. Admission of
an error could lead to to an adverse evaluation or even
punishment.
3. The aviators and NFO's are well aware that all
incident reports eventually find their way into the Naval
Safety Center's computer. They realize that mistakes made
by them for any reason will follow them throughout their
careers, because their complete file is available at any
time to their Commanding Officer.
The fact that many, perhaps even a majority, cf the
errors made by these individuals could be directly or
indirectly linked to human factors deficiencies or other
non-judgement sources, has little bearing on the fact that
these men perceive the act of reporting an error as a threat
to themselves. For the above reasons it is suspected that
the Naval Safety Center's data bank is not representative of
the real world but, more important, the Naval Safety Center
has lost credibility and with that credibility, a means of
identifying problems before they spawn accidents.
20

C. DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES
There are a number of available techniques for gathering
the required cockpit human factors deficiency data base.
Most have teen used at one time or another in the past to
gather human factors data in the aviation community. All
have their advantages and disadvantages and many will be
discussed herein.
The means of collecting the data can best be broken into
two general areas; (1) that which uses as the data source
the actual personnel who fly the aircraft, and, (2) that
which uses other sources such as the Naval Air Developement
Center Human Factors Branch personnel, computer simulations,
a traveling team of human factors experts who could visit
various Naval Air Stations in search of hard data, and other
such "non-human operator" related collection methods.
Atkins (1 969) worked in the operational arena in gathering
data for a study of 0*. 5. Air Force aircrew work station
geometry. He concluded, after collecting data from a broad
range of sources, that none was as comprehensive, easy to
get and as valuable as aircrew generated data obtained in an
operational environment. The author concurred with that
evaluation and will henceforth in this study be concerned
only with those data gathering techniques using aircrew
personnel as the data source. Techniques considered were
the at-source, group orientation, and command methods
originally presented by Vasilas et al(1953); the critical
incident technique (Flanagan , 1963), and questionnaire
methods (Oppenheim, 1966).
Vasilas
€t al(1953) focused their study on developement
of procedures for gathering U. S. Air Force near-accident
21

data. Three methods - at-source, group orientation, and
command - were studied. In the first method, individual
report blanks were made available for reporting hazardous
incidents after flight. Forms were placed in many
convenient locations and aircrew personnel were instructed
to report any incidents they experienced or observed.
Completed reports were to be sealed in an envelope and
dropped in a collection box.
In the group orientation method, an interviewer
instructed groups of 10 airmen at a time on the nature of
the procedure and the value of collecting such incidents.
He then had the men write descriptions of whatever incidents
they could recall and seal them in an envelope prior to
collection. The command method for collecting data was a
system in operation at several air bases. Subordinate units
were required to maintain weekly activity reports which
included reports of near-accidents.
Analysis of the results of the study showed nearly two
and one-half times as many incidents were obtained with the
group orientation method as opposed to the at-source method.
It was thought that this was due mainly to peer pressure to
conform and the increased awareness of the need for
collection of the incident reports brought about by the
presence of the interviewer.
Over seventeen times as many incidents were collected by
the group orientation method as were collected by the
command method. Chapanis (1959) made the following
observations regarding that aspect of the study:
"Most of the incidents reported in the command method
were incidents which were certainly observed by someone
else.
Most interesting, however, was the distribution of
types of items. In the command method, most of the
reported incidents fell into the cateaory of mechanical
malfunction. In the group orientation" method most of
22

the reported incidents fell in the category of personal
errors.
A reasonable interpretation of these results is that
the crew members hesitate to report incidents under the
command method because they are afraid the incidents
will be used to evaluate or punish them." (Chapanis,
1959)
The critical incident technique is yet another viable
means of gathering data such as that required for the
cockpit deficiencies data base. The critical incident
technique was originated by Flanagan ( 1 962) and involves
asking, "Tell me about some mistake or error you have made
in operating this equipment", of the operator of .a
particular equipment. The basic assumption underlying the
method is that from a large number of personnel one can
determine most of the diff iculties (errors) which lead to
critical situations for any particular raan-machine system.
Daniels ( 1 976 ) successfully used the critical incident
technigue in a group orientation setting to establish the
existence of the Naval Aviator and Naval Flight Officer as a
previously untapped and valuable source of human factors
cockpit deficiency data. The data provided in Tables I and
II was gathered using that technique.
Questionnaires have the advantage of being very
versatile and have proven ability to gather virtually any
type of data. ppenheim { 1 966) discusses at length the
advantages and disadvantages of the many types of
questionnaires and questionnaire techniques.
There are undoubtedly many variations and combinations
of the above techniques as well as other less known
techniques which would be applicable to the cockpit
deficiency collection effort. However, the techniques
considered above are the .uore accepted of those availaole




D. COLLECTION TECHNIQUE REQUIREMENTS
Any successful effort to gather the required
comprehensive human factors cockpit deficiencies data base
must first overcome a number of problems, some of which are
unique to the operational environment from which the data
will come and some of which are common to any comprehensive
data gathering effort. The data source itself involves
thousands of aviators and NFO's who man the cockpits of
dozens of different aircraft types. The aircraft squadrons
to which these men are assigned have many different missions
and are scattered widely in location through the United
States and the world. Keeping those factors in mind, it
would therefore be desirable that tne data collection
vehicle possess the following attributes:
1. 3e applicable to aircraft types ranging from
helicopters to fighter-bombers and to men whose missions
vary from highly demanding to exceedingly routine.
2. Be relatively easy and cost effective to
administer, collect, and analyse.
3. Be efficient from the standpoint of taking as
little time as possible tc complete, since time is a
particularly valuable asset of fleet aviators and NFO's.
4. Be capable of eliciting data to the depth and
detail required.
5. Be capable of eliciting from the men involved their
true thoughts and opinions by removing any threat of
evaluation or punishment. If you want to collect a
24

maximum amount of data involving human error you have to
divorce the threat of punishment or evaluation from the
reporting (Chapanis, 1959).
6. Be structured such that fleet aviators and NFO's
will find responding to be an interesting learning
experience as well as a duty.
7. Have incorporated into it a system which will
permit the respondent to quantify, (1) the degree to
which he perceives a particular deficiency to be a
physically or mentally difficult problem, and, (2) the
degree to which he perceives a particular deficiency to
be a safety hazard. Such a system would allow relative




E. COLLECTION TECHNIQUE SELECTION
Available techniques for data collection were
considered, the foregoing requirements being used as the
basis for selection of the collection vehicle. Candidates
were the group orientation, personal interview, critical
incident and questionnaire techniques. The decision was
made to use a combination of the group orientation, critical
incident and questionnaire techniques as the best, course of
action considering the requirements of this particular
situation
.
The choice of the combination of techniques was made on
the premise that the data could best be collected with a
comprehensive questionnaire composed of many detailed, open
ended questions, each requiring short answers. This
questionnaire would include a quantification scheme for
measuring relative magnitudes of deficiency severity and
criticality. In a sense each question could be considered a
separate application of the critical incident technique. If
employed on a fleet-wide basis, the questionnaires could be
forwarded in quantity to Navy aircraft squadrons where the
squadron Safety Officer would conduct the briefing cf the
respondents in accordance with procedures of the group
orientation method. The questionnaires would then be
distributed to each individual, to be sealed upon completion
by the individual and mailed individually, or completed
sealed and returned to the Safety Officer for mailing to the
collection center.
The following advantages appear to accrue from using the




1. A questionnaire can readily be tailored to the
needs of the researcher and include open or closed
questions. The author surmised that, because cf the
diverse nature of the aircraft cockpits and missions, the
use of closed questions was not feasible. Too many
questions, or else many different questionnaires would
have been required. However, detailed open questions,
probinq the many and varied aspects of control, display,
and general workspace desiqn, were feasible and
particularly applicable to the diverse range of data
available.
2. The cost of using mailed questionnaires is far
more reasonable than other data gatherinq means
available
.
3. If constructed properly, the questionnaire would
solicit short answers to the open questions which could
then easily be cateqorized. This would promote
efficiency from the respondents point of view as well as
the analyst.
4. Use of a questionnaire with detailed open questions
would allow quantification by the respondent of severity
and criticality of specific and general deficiencies.
This quantification, when averaged over enouqh responses,
would provide a number which would allow rankings of
cockpit deficiencies for each aircraft in terms of degree
of severity.
5. The questionnaire which can be completed at the
respondents leisure in privacy can most readily promote
the important idea of anonymity.
6. By providing detailed questions, incidents which
may not have been recalled using the critical incident
27

technique, stand a much better chance of being recalled.
Detailed guestions could also be used to educate the
aviator or NFO in the basic principles of human factors






The questionnaire was designed around general principles
established by Oppenheim ( 1 966) . It was envisioned that the
final product would be a comprehensive, open question
questionnaire with sufficient questions of great enough
detail to include all relevant aspects of human factors
engineering in cockpit design. However, it is noted that
because of the diversity of aircraft types, the fact that
Naval Aviators and NFO's are involved, and the subjective
nature of the perceived deficiencies, the questions could
not De made detailed enough to result in across the board
short answers. That, and the fact that the questionnaire
was necessarily lengthy in order to cover the broad
application of human factors in cockpit design, are
preliminarily recognized as disadvantages.
The process of formalizing the questionnaire was a
lengthy one involving decisions as to the content of the
many individual questions, the content of the questionnaire
introduction and instructions, the types of personal data to
reguest from the respondent, the type of deficiency severity
quantification scheme to employ, and many other important
factors such as questionnaire format, etc. The overall
questionnaire design employed Oppenheira's principles as well
as the data collection requirements discussed previously.
Questions were grouped within the questionnaire into
29

four major categories of Controls and Primarily Tactile
Functions, Displays and Primarily Visual Functions,
Psychological Factors, and Miscellaneous Factors. A short
introduction was provided for each category.
The introduction to the questionnaire was designed so as
to acquaint the respondent with human factors engineering
concepts and generally put him at ease. The prelude to the
questions themselves required a short description of the
concept of system safety and human factors engineering, an
explanation cf the purpose of the survey and its general
contents, definitions of key terms such as "control" and
"display", instructions for completing the questionnaire and
a statement of the anonymity of the sources of specific
data. (See Appendix A which comprises the finished
questionnaire.
)
In order to have a means of quantifying the amount of
physical or mental difficulty a particular deficiency
presents to the operator, a severity scale was conceived. A
criticality scale was also conceived, this scale being a
means by which the operator quantifies his perception cf the
deficiency's hazard to safe flight. Both scales range from
one to five with five representing the highest severity or
criticality. Table III, which appears also in the
questionnaire, explains the ratings more thoroughly. It is
hypothesized that these quantifications of deficiency
severity and criticality, when averaged over a moderate
number of responses for a particular deficiency, will
provide a viable measure of severity and criticality. This
will permit the ranking of deficiencies for a particular
cockpit in terms of their perceived contributions to
inefficient and/or unsafe operations.
An initial data section at the beginning of the
questions comprises the only personal data required cf the
30

SEVERITY AND CRITICALITY RATING SHEET
You are asked to rate deficiency severity and criticality
numerous times within this questionnaire. The scale ranges
from 1 to 5 with the higher numbers indicating increased
severity and criticality. In order to provide clarification
of the meaning of each rating the following interpretation
is provided:
SEVERITY-The difficulty the named deficiency presents to the
operator.
Rating Reaching, seeing, interpreting, etc. , this
control or display or performing this act, in
my opinion,
1 is not at all difficult or only slightly so
2 is somewhat difficult
3 is quite difficult
4 is extremely difficult
5 is impossible or nearly so
CRITICALITY-The potential of the named deficiency for
causing an accident or serious incident.
Rating Reaching, seeing, interpreting, etc., this
control or display or performing this act, in
my opinion,
1 has virtually no effect on flight safety
2 has some potential for causing an accident or
serious incident.
3 has considerable potential for causing an
accident or serious incident
4 has great potential for causing an accident or
serious incident
5 either already has caused an accident or serious
incident or will cause one in the near future
Table III -r Severity and Criticality Rating Sheet
31

respondents. Requested is the date, the squadron to which
the individual is assigned, whether the respondent is a
pilot or NFO, the aircraft the respondent currently flies
and is critiqing, the hours flown in that aircraft and the
total hours flown. This data will allow analyses as to
differences in perceived deficiency severity and criticality
among pilots and NFO's of different experience levels.
The questionnaire content, with respect to individual
question composition, was drawn from a variety of sources,
including the authors' experience, MIL-STD- 1472
,
HIL-STD-882, the work done by Schobert (1 976) in categorizing
deficiencies, and the actual critical incident technique
data collected by Daniels (1 976) .
The questionnaire was printed in double-spaced format on
one side of the paper only, for ease of reading as well as
ease of refering to previous pages while completing the
questionnaire. It was considered that these advantages as
well as comments made in the introduction, would overcome




The completed questionnaire was administered to
twenty-one Naval Aviators and four Naval Flight Officers in
attendance at a six-week. Aviation Safety Officer course at
the U. S. Naval Aviation Safety School, Naval postgraduate
School, Monterey, California. This population serves
excellently as a test group for verifying the applicability,
reliability and validity of the questions contained in the
questionnaire, in that the men involved are for the most
part currently proficient in an operational aircraft, and
are assigned to many different types of aircraft. It would
be feasible for the author to collect a large quantity of
data on a specific type aircraft. However, it is preferable
at this point to instead concentrate on ensuring that the
questionaire content is broad enough and yet specific enough
to apply to all naval aircraft. The respondents were given




Table IV summarizes the numerical data obtained from the
twenty-five completed questionnaires. For each question the
total number of responses to that question, total number of
different aircraft types cited, and breakdown of severity
and criticality ratings, by responses per rating, are given.
For example, question number one obtained forty-one
responses distributed over eight different types of
aircraft. With regards to criticality, six of the
deficiencies identified via question one were judged as
having great potential for causing an accident or serious
incident (assigned a rating of 4), and two were considered to
have either already caused an accident or serious incident
or would cause one in the near future (assigned a rating of
5) . The asterisked columns in the table identify the number
of responses for which no rating was assigned. The final
page of Table IV provides a percentage breakdown of the
severity and criticality assignments overall. In all, 539
human factors cockpit deficiencies were identified by 25
respondents. The 539 deficiencies were distributed over 15
different aircraft types.
The variety of responses and the detail which many of
the respondents provided made summarization of the complete
data nearly impossible. Therefore Tables V and VI are
provided as examples of the varied responses obtained.
Table V comprises the responses to question thirty-one while
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TABLE V - RESPONSES TO QUESTION THIRTY-ONE
QUESTION: During critical phases of flight such as
take-off, low altitude manuevers, multiple aircraft
rendezvous', approaches, and landings, are you ever bothered
by distractions from inside the cockpit such as ncises,
lights, etc.?
SEVERITY/
RESPONDENT" AIRCRAFT CRITICALITY RESPONSE
NFO A-6E -/3 PLASHING BREAKAWAY LIGHTS IN
?ILOT[S OPTICAL SIGHT
Caused by weaDons computer
malfunction. Especially
hazardous during a night
carrier approach.
PILOT F-14A 2/2 GLOVE VANE POSITION LIGHTS-
Extremely bright. Come on
when putting gear and flaps
down for approach. Very
distracting and vertigo
inducing in IFR conditions.
PILOT P-3A 2/2 COCKPIT LIGHTING - The
location of the floodlight
used to illuminate the pilots
approach plate is such that
the pilots head interferes
and casts a shadow.
PILOT S-3A 3/3 ACLS ADVISORY LIGHTS - ACLS
lights cannot be dimmed.
PILOT S-3A -/- NIGHT FORMATION FLIGHT- The
S-3 canopy is very larae and
the cockpit lighting is
reflected back towards the
pilot. Very distracting for
night formation flying.
PILOT S-3A 3/3 ACLS ADVISORY LIGHTS - No
rheostat for the ACLS
advisory lights. They ire













a real bother at
MAD pattern.
PILOT A-4/TA-4 2/2 LAWS AURAL TONS - No volume
control on the Low Altitude
Warninq System aural tone.
On low level routes tone is
super loud.
PILOT A-4/TA-4 2/2 IFF CAUTION LIGHT
Frequently comes on in flight
and is particularly
distracting because it is red
and fairly close to the fire
warning light.
PILOT F-4J 3/3 WINDSHIELD DEFOG - I find it
very uncomfortable on descent
and approach to have hct air
blasting in my face so I
don't always use it although
required to.
PILOT A-7 3 2/2 MASTER FUNCTION SWITCHES
When selected at night the
yellow lights are too bright
and cause considerable
annoyance.
PILOT A-7S 2/2 OXYGEN LIGHT/MASTER CAUTION
-On 75% of all catapault
shots the oxygen light 'will
come on and cause the Master
Caution Light to flash. This
is an inoDDortune time to
have to look down at the
Master Caution Panel.
PILOT S-3A 4/2 ACLS LIGHTS - Way too
bright. No brightness
control. When we are Dlanning
on flying night approaches we
take masking tape to put over
these lights and that doesn't
help too much.
PILOT A-4/TA-4 1/2 IFF LIGHT ON GLARE SHIELD -
Distracting in almost anv




TABLE VI - RESPONSES TO QUESTION TEN
QUESTION - Think specifically of emergency procedures. Do
any of these require manipulations of switches and controls
or sequencing of actions which, in your opinion, are too




PILOT F-14A 3/3 TRIM PROCEDURE - Emergency
procedure in case of split
flaps/slats or stuck
spoilerj(in fliqht) requires
attempting to" counter an
uncommanded roll with
ODDOsite lateral stick while
trimming in the opposite
direction to provide maximum
opposite spoiler deflection.
The movement of the stick and
trimming are done
simultaneously in opposite
directions with the same
hand.
NFO RF-4B 3/2 RADAR SCOPE - Radar scope is
a distracting nuisance to the
Dilot
.
PILOT P-3A 3/3 EGRESS FROM PILOT'S SEAT -
If a oilot were ever required
to bail out of a P3 he would
most likely not make it.
NFO RF-4E 5/4 CIRCUIT BREAKERS
Controlling circuit breakers
in emergency procedures for
this aircraft is a procedure
that is hopelessly complex.
PILOT S-3A 3/2 AIR START PROCEDURE - There
are 10 separate items en tne
memory checklist.

TABLE 71 - CONTINUED
SEVERITY/
RESPONDENT AIRCRAFT CRITICALITY RESPONSE







PILOT S-2A 2/5 EMERGENCY LANDING GEAR
EXTENSION - Takes too much
time, effort and attention
from the pilot if he has to
do it himself and will
severely distract the
co-pilot. This has caused
previous fatal accidents.
PILOT A-7A 1/4 EMERGENCY LANDING GEAR
EXTENSION - Requires using
left hand (normally on
throttle) to pull handle and












thus taking* riaht hand from
stick. This is a very unsafe
and uncomfortable procedure.
PILOT A-7A/B/C 4/5 EMERGENCY POWER PACKAGE -
Unless cat shot taken with
this deployed (debatable) the
reaction/action/run- up time
would be too lona. You cannot
get to the EPP "fast enough




In all, five hundred and thirty-nine human factors
cockpit deficiencies were identified by twenty-five
respondents to the Cockpit Deficiency Questionnaire. This
factor alone provides ample justification for placing
additional emphasis on this technique for gathering the
reguired human factors cockpit deficiency data. The
approximately twenty-two responses per respondent compares
very favorably with the average two responses per respondent
obtained by Daniels (1 976) and Scaobert ( 1 976) . The data
contained in Tables V and VI evidences the wide variety of
existing cockpit deficiencies and the range of severity and
critality ratings of those deficiencies.
While the Cockpit Deficiencies Questionnaire was very
successful in gathering varied data, there was an
insufficient number of respondents reporting on any one
specific aircraft cockpit to permit analysis of a specific
cockpit. The numbers of respondents for a given type
aircraft varied from five S-3A pilots to one A-6E NFO and
one F-1UA pilot. Therefore, the comments and conclusions
made herein are at best tentative and serve only to identify
trends and probable areas for concern on the part of safety
specialists and design engineers. Further application of
this data collection technique to large groups of operators
will provide the material needed for in-depth analyses.
Subjective analysis of the data from the twenty-five
completed questionnaires leads the author to the following
tentative conclusions as an example of the types of existing
u£

cockpit deficiencies which can be identified with the
questionnaire technique.
1. Design personnel have not in the past taken into
account the fact that aviators and NFO's must at times
wear heavy, bulky, restrictive clothing such as wet suits
and winter survival equipment. When this type of
equipment is worn in most of today's aircraft the
operators capability for reaching required controls is
degraded significantly. This problem and the related one
of fatigue associated with wearing a wet suit for long
periods of time, extends across many types of aircraft.
2. Circuit breaker location and accessabilit y appears
to be a problem in *any aircraft. As an example, F-14A
front cockpit circuit breakers are unlighted and
difficult to reach and could be the primary causal factor
of an accident should there arise a requirement for the
pilot to pull or reset one at night in an extremis
situation
.
3. The S-3A aircraft appears to have a number of human
factors deficiencies designed into its cockpit. Among
the many deficiencies cited by the five S-3A pilots are
f
the following:
(a) The flap switch is actuated by reaching over and
behind the throttles. This control is detented such
that when a flap movement is required the pilot must
devote his full visual attention to the task.
(b) The launch bar switch is easily inadvertently
actuated. A lowered launch bar will cause damage if it
is down during an arrested landing.
(c) The ACLS (Automatic Carrier Landing System)
advisory lights are very bright and cannot be dimmed.
The ACLS is primarily of value in night, IFR conditions
and thus, in- order to use the ACLS, one must accept the
distractions at a time when they are least needed.
This problem is identified in Table VI.
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(d) The fire warning system is easily confused.
There are two warning lignts, one in front of each
pilot, which warn of a fire in either of the two
engines. When the pilot sees the fire warning light he
is to immediately look to the "fire pull handles".
Lights in the "pull handles" identify the engine which
is on fire. He is then to place the appropriate
throttle off, pull the correct pull handle, and secure
the correct ignition. Apparently a number of
experienced aviators have mistakenly secured the
left (good) engine when given a right engine failure in
the S-3 simulator. It appears likely that the fact
that the pilot observes the left hand light more
clearly than the right hand light, predisposes him to
identifying the left engine as the problem.
4. Personal equipment and navigation publication
stowage constitutes a real problem in many aircraft
cockpits from the P-3A to the F-14A.
5. Ejection seat discomfort and related fatigue
factors are a major source of contention among aviators
and NFO's. In addition, it appears that the
primary (upper) firing handle on most Navy ejection seats
is unusable to a large segment of the operato rs. Nearly
fifty percent of the deficiencies noted in question
fifty-five were related to ejection seat problems and
received ratings of four or five in criticality. See
Table III.
6. There appears to be a problem across most aircraft
with warning signals such as fire warning lights.
Question fifty-four, which queried respondents as to the
adequecy of the signals, received eighteen responses
across ten aircraft types.
In addition to providing cockpit deficiency data, the
twenty-five completed questionnaires yielded information
pertaining to the quality and applicability of the
48

questions. Again the small number of respondents for each
type aircraft limited the author's ability to make firm
conclusions. The following tentative conclusions are made:
1. The majority of the respondents considered the time
spent completing the questionnaire to have been very
worthwhile. Negative reaction to the length of the
questionnaire was minimal.
2. Questions 20, 21, and 22 appear to have significant
overlap as presently written and could be combined into
one question.
3. Question 1 should be moved into the interior of the
questionnaire as its generality and position as the first
question answered, prompted many responses which better
fit other questions. A more specific question should be
chosen for the leai-off question.
4. Thought should be given to combining questions 19
and 39 in as much as the respondents were unable to
clearly differentiate between the two situations.
5. Questions 4, 8, 13, 17, 22, 24, 25, 34, 36, 41, 48,
49, 50, 53, 56, 57, 53, and 63 received three or less
responses each and should be reviewed with respect to the
rewording or combining of questions.
On the basis of the 539 deficiencies identified and
rated for severity and criticality, the quantification
technique appeared to be valid. Additional data must be
collected and analysed before the technique can be fully
validated, however, the overall response summarization
provided in Table IV shows that the responses tend to be
approximately normal for both severity and criticality
ratings. In both cases the distribution is skewed slightly
left with the modal response being a two.
The only major questionnaire technique disadvantage
noted by the author was the fact tha.t the responses are

descriptive and, although the majority are short, there is
nevertheless a requirement to read and analyse each comment
to determine the precise nature of the deficiency. This is
time consuming and inefficient and will ultimately impact
substantially on the cost of the data collection program.
However, the subjectivity and variability of the data is a
reflection of the variability of the human operators




The Cockpit Deficiencies Questionnaire should be
validated further as soon as possible by being administered
to approximately one-hundred pilots and NFO*s from each of
two aircraft communities. Preferably a single-seat and a
pilot/NFO manned aircraft would be chosen.
Once the questionnaire has been adequately validated it
should be administered Navy-wide to a sufficient number of
aviators and NFO's from each type aircraft to allow
establishment of the human factors cockpit deficiency data
base. Having established the data base, a comprehensive
effort can be made to identify deficiencies which exist
across different aircraft types. The resulting analysis
should be directed towards improving and updating present
design criteria.
Concurrent with the effort to provide better design
criteria should be an effort to identify, categorize, and
correct the most critical deficiencies existing in today's
aircraft. The information being gathered on each specific
aircraft for inclusion in the data base can be analysed
separately with the goal of ranking deficiencies in terms of
deficiency severity and criticality. Such an analysis will
allow establishment of priorities in the program to correct






This questionnaire involves System Safety/Human Factors
Engineering (SS/HFE) and its relationship to you, the pilot
or NFO assigned a seat in one of the dozens of aircraft
types in the Navy inventory. The results of this survey
will affect Naval Aviation Safety as well as future aircraft
design.
System Safety/Human Factors Engineering can most simply
be described as "the process of designing for safe and
efficient human use". The objective of SS/HFE as it relates
to cockpit design is to provide you, the human operator,
with a cockpit which is designed with the full range of your
capabilities and limitations in mind. Cockpits should be
adapted to your limitations; you should not be the one who
does all the adapting. Please note that the word cockpit as
used herein refers to the entire cockpit layout including
seats, control system and other controls, displays,
environmental system, etc.
There are certainly many good and bad designs for each
item in a cockpit and SS/HFE strives to incorporate tne good
while eliminating the bad. Unfortunately, System Safety and
Human Factors Engineers were non-existent when some of the
aircraft we fly were designed and, for various reasons, the
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latest SS/HFE technology and knowledge has not been fully
integrated into the more modern aircraft. Thus, the cockpit
in which you presently get your flight time may have
benefited to varying degrees from SS/HFE expertise.
As noted above there are good and bad designs. But how
is the good to be differentiated from the bad? In the old
days if man could function at all in a cockpit, the design
was considered a success. We have come a long way since
then but while a great deal of research is being done in
cockpit design, the effort continues to be hindered
substantially by the lack of complete understanding of how
the human mind functions in recognizing, processing and
responding to stimuli. In the abscence of concrete
information a major (and costly) source of data with respect
to good versus bad design turns out to be the aircraft
accident report. If a particular display or control can be
directly related to an accident it has a good chance of
being identified as a problem. At worst the problem will be
recognized and additional training and emphasis will be
devoted tc countering ( adapting to) the hazard.
But what about the problems which are not so obvious?
How about the "pilot error" accidents which never really get
to the heart of the matter? What of the many incidents or
near accidents which go unreported because of our
inclination to feel that no matter how well or poorly
designed a system is, we should be able to master it just
the same. The fact is that you and all of your
contemporaries are limited in your capacity to perform by
many factors, the most significant of which involve the
functioning of the human brain. Absolute limits exist in
the amount of information you can process at any one time,
reaction times, etc. Deficiencies in the design of the
controls and displays located around you in the cockpit can
slightly slew your actions, overload your ability to process

sensory inputs, confuse you when you don't need to be
confused, and in general cause you not to be at your best.
The purpose of this survey is to identify the major
deficiencies which exist in the current inventory aircraft
as seen ty the men who fly them. Unbelievably, this has not
been done before on this scale. The resulting data will be
an invaluable aid in identifying current safety problems and
will provide the basis for improved design criteria.
INSTRUCTIONS
The questions in this survey have been grouped into four
main categories according to the general subject of the
question. Each section is preceded by a brief description
of the subject matter included in that section. The four
sections are:
1. Controls and Primarily Tactile Functions
2. Human Behavior (Includes conditioning and transfer of
training)
3. Displays and Primarily Visual Functions
4. Miscellaneous (Includes environment, NFO/co-pilot
station lighting, etc.)
Most of the questions involve your identifying specific
components which you consider deficient within a particular
context. In addition to identifying that component, you are
asked to assign a number from 1 to 5 which you feel best
describes the degree of severity of the deficiency ( to what
extent is it a physical or mental problem to you) and the
criticality of the deficiency ( to what extent does it
constitute a safety hazard) . In both cases the number 1

represents the lowest extent and the number 5 the highest.
At this time you should detach the very last page from the
survey, as that page provides further guidance with respect
to the meaning you should attach to each code. Keep that
page handy for reference while filling out the survey.
The questionnaire was designed so as to require of you a
minimum amount of writing and as small an investment of your
time as possible. The disadvantage of this, however, is
that it restricts you from fully expressing your opinions in
cases where the questionnaire doesn't include enough options
or doesn't cover a particular area. Please feel free to
write notes in the margins or expound at length on the
reverse side of a page. All comments will be read and taken
into account in evaluating your response.
You will undoubtedly encounter some redundancy in the
questions and you will undoubtedly find yourself identifying
the same component as a problem in two or more contexts.
That is to be expected. Each question is significantly
different in regards to its purpose in the overall data
gathering effort.
Comment only on the aircraft you are now flying or
flying in. Also comment only on the seat you occupy unless
instructed differently. If you are flying two or more types
of aircraft concurrently, select the one with which ycu are
most familiar. If you feel very strongly about a deficiency
in another aircraft feel free to include that information
but please denote those entries with an asterisk (*) in the
left margin.
NFO 1 s — Deficiencies in the controls and displays you
operate and monitor will impinge heavily on mission
effectiveness and directly or indirectly affect safety of
flight. But if you are in a side by side cockpit arrangement

you have a need to monitor the pilots instruments and share
some functions with him. You therefore should identify any
problems with items that are on his side of the cockpit but
which you also operate and monitor on a shared basis.
However, identify also all controls and displays for which
you alone are responsible . The intent of the survey is to
identify all control and display problems, not just the ones
the pilot has.
Work independently on the survey. Please don't attempt
to rally the rest of the squadron around your point of view.
If a particular item is a problem it will be identified by a
sufficient number of individuals to stand out in the final
analysis
.
Try to take into account when thinking about each
particular question that we as individuals tend to learn to
live with deficiencies and in time accept them as normal.
Some call this the "can do" spirit. The point is that in
taking this survey you are being asked to care full y reflect
u£C£ 12^1 capacity to perform is XQ2£ cockpit and try to
isLSUti^y. everything that pothers ^ou^ e ve n t hough it ma v. be
min or. Your ratings of severity and criticality for each
item will indicate the degree to which you think it is a
problem. An item which may constitute only a nuisance to
you because you have overcome it, may present a serious
problem to someone else.
The words "control" and "display" are used often in this
survey. They are general terms and for the purposes of this
survey are defined as follows:
CONTROL
Any stick, push button, thumbwheel, knob, pull handle,
toggle switch, rotary switch, pedal, crank, lever,
handwheel, etc., which is used by a human operator to

control something in the cockpit.
DISPLAY
Any cathode ray tube, gage, tape, signal light, instrument,
instrument face, label, etc. , which provides some type of
visual information to the human operator.
Don't rush through this survey. It may get tedious in
spots but for the most part the questions are of the type
which should have been asked years ago and should be of
interest to you.
Because this questionnaire has been written for pilots
and NFO's and for every aircraft imaginable it is
necessarily general. If you feel that particular questions
are too general and that valuable data is going to go
uncollected then make some specific criticisms on the last
page in the area reserved for general comments.
Please note that you are not asked to identify yourself
at any point in this survey. This has been done in crder to
make you feel secure in the knowledge that any adverse
comments you make can never be backtracked to you. The
final analysis will be looking at groups, not individuals.
Also note that the originators of this survey are not
under the illusion that this survey and the results thereof
will be a cureall for Naval Aviation Safety's ills. The
originators do, however, expect to get from this survey a
valuable data base which may then be used to work toward a
short term goal of eliminating serious design deficiencies
in present aircraft cockpits and a longterm goal of
designing System Safety and Human Factors Engineering into
the cockpit at the design stage.

Please fill in the blanks in the following questions
before continuing with the survey. this data will be used
in the analysis portion of the project.
Date Squadron^
Are you a pilot or NFO (circle one)
Type aircraft you currently fly and which you are
critiging in this survey.
Hours in that type aircraft (a pprox.
)




CONTROLS AND PRIMARILY TACTILE FUNCTIONS
This section applies primarily to controls. As noted
previously, types of controls includa sticks, push buttons,
thumbwheels, knobs, handles, toggle switches, rotary
switches, cranks, levers, pedals, handwheels, etc. In
answering these questions try to put yourself mentally into
the seat which you normally occupy in flight and visualize
the problems you have or have had in the past.

1. Do you feel that the controls in your cockpit are well
placed from the standpoint that the more important and more
used controls are given preferential locations over controls
that are less used and not as critical? (Do you find
yourself frequently reaching across the cockpit for
something which should be better located?) If you feel
there are any problems in this regard note the control and
problem or just comment generally below. Pay particular
attention to emergency controls.




2. Are ycu aware of any controls that are located or
designed such that they stand a reasonably good chance of
being inadvertently actuated by your elbow, forearm, side of
hand, flight suit sleeve, knee, etc., as you are doing
something else? If so, please identify the control and the
type problem it presents.




3. Vibration as well as excessive G-forces sometimes have
a tendency to change power settings or other control
positions without the operator becoming fully aware. Is
this a problem with any of your controls? If so, please so
comment below.




4. Do you have any controls which you consider poorly
designed because they have too many functions on one switch
or have diverse unrelated functions on the same switch? If
this type of problem exists then identify the problem below.




5. Some controls which govern sequential type operations
are detented such that one can proceed in a logical fashion
from one step to another. If you have any detented controls
and you have problems with them please identify them below.




6. Do you find that operation of a particular control or
controls tends to be vertigo inducing? If so, please note
the control and phase of flight.
CONTROL PROBLEM SEVER- CRITI-
ITY CALITY

7. Are the controls in your cockpit standardized; ie,
pushing up on a toggle switch should turn things on,
clockwise on a knob should increase whatever the knob
controls? If you find that you continually try to do
something "backwards" with a control, it is a pretty good
bet that the control is non-standard. Remember, controls
include buttons, switches, pull handles, pedals, knobs,
thumbwheels, etc.




8. Do you feel that the functions you perform routinely
in flight are balanced sufficiently between right and left
hands? There might be a problem if quite a few things are
being done by one hand such that that hand is overloaded
while the other is often free. If you have strong feelings
about this comment briefly below.




9. Are you required to operate any controls which are so
complex or "tricky" to operate that they constitute a








10. Think specifically of emergency procedures. Do any of
these require manipulations of switches and controls or
sequencing of actions which, in your opinion, are too
complex and time consuming? If so, please identify the
problem below.




11. Do you have any controls which you find physically
difficult to operate because of the excessive force
required? Pedals, pull handles, etc.
,
might fall into this
category
.




12. Do you have any controls which are physically
difficult to operate because of the awkward positioning
movement required? Perhaps there is insufficient leverage,
or an obstruction to movement which could cause this
problem.




13. Do you have any controls which give you problems
because they are difficult to adjust as precisely as
required? If so, please note' the problems below.




14. Are you able to reach without difficulty all controls
which you feel you need to reach while securely restrained
in your sear as if for takeoff or landing? If not please
identify these controls which present a problem.




15. Are you able to reach without difficulty all controls
which you feel you need to reach while in normal flight (not
necessarily securely restrained) . If not please identify
these controls which present a problem.




16. Can you think of any controls which require excessive
visual attention in order to operate them properly? (you
must spend too much time looking at that control or
control-display interface as you actuate it when you should
be monitoring other things. A control-display interface
might be something like the control with which you check
fuel quantity when you have numerous tanks but only one
needle on the gage. If you need to hold a button or switch
in a certain position too long while checking something then
you may have a problem.) Identify any such problems below.




17. One way in which we receive information is via
feedback through our tactile senses. Artificial feel in a
control stick is an example. Can you think of any controls
which lack this feel but which could be better operated with
it incor pcrated?




18. Are there any problems in the area of foot operated
controls such as rudder pedals and brakes? ( Problems might
be such things as too much pressure required, can't reach,
foot slips off, etc.) Please identify any deficient
controls and the problem below.




19. Can you think of any situation wherein your primary
means of identifying a particular control is by feel but
there is another control in close proximity which is very
similar and could easily be confused with the one you want?
If you have ever in the past almost actuated the wrong
control, it may have been the result of a problem such as
this. Please identify any problems below.




Although, in actuality, circuit breakers have a very
important place in an aircraft cockpit they are often second
citizens when it comes to finding a place to put them.
Occasionally they are hard to operate and this, combined
with intermittently having to stand on ones head to reach
them, sometimes presents a problem. Please focus your
attention on circuit breaker problems for the next few
questions.
20. Bo you have any difficulty in identifying specific
circuit breakers when you have a need to check them, reset
rhem, etc., because of lack of labeling or confusing
labelina?




21. Are key circuit breakers located such that they are
difficult to see or reach? Note whether the problem is in
seeing, reaching, or both.




22. Do you have any physical problems in pulling and
resetting circuit breakers as may be required? Do gang bar
type circuit breakers present any particular problems? If
so, identify the problem circuit breakers below.




As a consequence of your status as a member of the human
race there are definite limitations on your capacity to
perform specific physical and mental acts. But we find it
difficult to admit to our limitations, in part because we
don't really know what they are. One of the things which we
encounter throughout our lifetimes and which we seldom
consciously consider is a thing called negative transfer of
training or, in short, negative transfer. Transfer of
training refers to the way in which new learning is
influenced by previous learning; negative transfer refers to
a situation wherein previous learning interferes with new
learning. (Of course positive transfer refers to the
situation wherein what we have learned previously helps us
to learn new material and this is what we strive fcr in our
training programs.)
But let us take a look at negative transfer. Have you
ever come across a light switch for which "up" turned the
lights off, a set of water faucet controls with hot on the
right and cold on the left, or a handle for a water faucet
which had to be turned clockwise to get water? Most of us
have encountered something like this at one time or another
where it seems that a particular control or display "works
backwords" or "works opposite to what it should". But the
reason it appears to work backwords is that we have learned,
to the point it has become habit, that light switches, water
faucets, etc., work a particular way - - - the right way.
Thus, if you are trying to learn to operate a light switch
for which "down" is "on" you run into negative transfer in
all its glory.
Another concept into which we seldom delve is that of
the fact that when we are under stress, inattentive, or
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fatigued we humans tend to revert to our best learned
response to a particular stimulus. Thus, if we thoroughly
learn how to operate the "backwards" light switch on the
previous page, we will have a tendency to try to operate it
the old way (the way we learned first and best) if we are
required to operate it under stress. This same phenomena
affects you in your flying. You learn many procedures and
responses to the point of their becoming habit. Many
emergency procedures are overlearned to the point that they
become automatic. Unfortunately different aircraft
sometimes require different procedures in response to the
same stimuli. A certain control may be located in six
different positions in as many aircraft cockpits. The fact
that there are differences between aircraft and the fact
that you need to overlearn some procedures, opens you up to
the possibility that you will occasionally substitute a
previously learned and incorrect response in an emergency
situation.
Keeping in mind the concepts of "negative transfer" and
"best learned response under stress" try to answer as best
you can the following questions:

23. Can you think of any specific disjDla.ys in your cockpit
which operate oppositely from what you think they should or
very differently from similar displays in another aircraft,
such that you tend to occasionally misinterpret them? If
so, do you think this is because of some previously learned
means of interpreting a display which you just cannot
unlearn or is it just a badly designed display? Note the
display and problem below.




24. Can you think of any specific controls in your cockpit-
which operate oppositely from what you think they should or
very differently from similar controls in another aircraft,
such that you tend to occasionally try to go the wrong way
with them? If so, do you think you are being influenced by
some previously learned means of operating a similar control
which you just cannot unlearn? If so, list the control and
problem below.




25. Under stress, when fatigued, or when inattentive have
you ever caught yourself reaching for a control or looking
for a display which does not exist in your cockpit. If so,
you are probably responding as you would in another cockpit.
If you have caught yourself doing that in your present
aircraft please attempt to identify the control or display
and the origin of the problem. Pay special attention to
those items involved in emergency procedures.
DISPLAY




The Navy is becoming increasingly reliant on cockpit
trainers and simulators to train and maintain the
proficiency of aviators and NFO,s. If you have occasion to
use such a device please answer the following question.
26. In your opinion does the trainer or simulator teach you
bad habits in the way of setting up false conditioning or
negative transfer. If so, comment below on the item and on
how you feel it adversely affects your ability to respond
properly in the real situation. Identify the training
device or simulator.




27. Forgetting is a very interesting aspect of human
behavior. Gear-up landings and fuel starvation due to
"forgotten" control activations are a fact of life in Naval
aviation. No matter how much is said or done about the
subject we continue to "forget" things. It is fact that the
degree of attention you are able to give to something you
want to remember, will have a lot to do with whether you do
in fact remember it. Out of all the switches, controls,
etc., you operate in the cockpit and all the things you
need to monitor, can you think of any which stand out as
being more easily forgotten than others? Please note that
turning a switch on and forgetting it can be just as
disasterous as forgetting to turn one on. Think of all
those "forgetting errors" you've made in the past and
identify the item .forgotten and any other pertinent
information below. Remember, this survey is totally
anonymous.




28. Just as we sometimes have no control over "forgetting"
things which should not be forgotten, we sometimes have no
control over our ignoring things which should not be
ignored. An example comes from the airline industry where
it has been suggested that a possible reason for commercial
airline pilots unintentionally flying below decision height
on an approach, in spite of a warning light which they have
preset to illuminate at decision height, is that day and
night, good weather and bad, the pilot sees that light come
on. Since he se<ss it countless times and does not use it
and since it is supplementary information to the barometric
and radar altimeters in any event, the pilot by habit, at a
time of high task load, learns to block this important
signal from his awareness. Can you think of any situations
which you encounter in your flying which may be similar to
this in that you become conditioned to ignore important
information because of the manner in which it is presented.
If so, please describe briefly the situation and associated
display.
CONTROL PR03LEM SEVER- CRITI-
ITY CALITY

29. Do you have any displays or controls which are
unreliable tc the extent that you have become conditioned to
expect them to be erroneous and thus have trouble convincing
yourself to believe them when they are right? If so, please
comment on this problem below.
DISPLAY




30. In the process of scanning an instrument panel you
eventually build up the experience which allows you to know,
without specifically focusing on a display, that it is
generally in the "ballpark" when it is working properly.
Once we become very familiar with a display we seldom look
closely at its detail because the human mind no longer
reguires it. Are there warning devices built into your more
critical instruments such that failure of the instrument
will be immediately apparent to you? If you have to inspect
the display closely to detect the failure then you have a
problem. Identify any such problems below.
DISPLAY PROBLEM SEVER- CBITI-
ITY CALITY

31. During critical phases of flight such as takeoff, low
altitude manuevers, multiple aircraft rendezvous',
approaches, and landings, are you ever bothered by
distractions from inside the cockpit such as noises, lights,
etc. If so, please identify the phase of flight and
distraction below.




DISPLAYS AND PRIMARILY VISUAL FUNCTIONS
This section applies primarily to displays. As noted
previously, types of displays include CRT's, gages, rapes,
warning lights, instruments, instrument faces, labels, etc.
Displays are anything which provide visual information to
the human operator.

32. Do you feel that the displays in your cockpit are well
placed from the standpoint that the more important and more
used displays are given preferential treatment over displays
that are less used and not as critical? If you feel there
are any problems in this regard note the display and problem
or just ccmment generally below.




33. Can you think of any displays which require too much
of your attention either during normal flight or during a
particular evolution? Perhaps the excessive attention you
need to devote to this display keeps you from monitoring
other equally important things. please note below the
displays, if any, you consider to be a problem .




34. Are the displays in your cockpit sufficiently
standardized as far as you are concerned; ie r circular gages
have pointers which increase in a clockwise direction, tape
movement upward corresponds to a numerical increase in the
factor being measured? Identify problem displays below.




35. Are the more important displays in your cockpit
sufficiently standardized in size such that they compete
equally for your attention or is there an important display
which is smaller and a problem because of its size? Please
note any problem displays below.
DISPLAY PROBLEM SEVER- CRITI-
ITY CALITY

36. Do you find that you have trouble getting information
from displays because the displays vibrate excessively? If
so, identify the display and the flight regime during which
the problem is most pronounced.




AT THIS POINT STOP AND CONSIDER WHAT YCU ARE DOING* Are
you giving this questionnaire your best effort or are you
going thru the motions? If you are going through the
motions then STOP, relax for a few minutes, and then try
again. Dc your best to determine the ratings for severity
(how physically or mentally difficult is the act of doing a
particular thing?) and criticaiity (how unsafe is the
problem?) as objectively as you can.

37. Do you experience any problems with glare on cockpit








38. Do you have any parallax problem with regard to
judging control settings? This type of problem might cause
erroneous interpretation of rotary switch positions, because
of the angle from which you view the control. Note any
problem controls below.




39. Are you required to work with any controls (toggle
switches, push buttons, pull handles, etc. ) which you
identify primarily by sight and which look similar, function
similarly, are located near each other, in your opinion
stand a reasonable chance of being mistaken for each other
and yet have entirely different functions? (If you have
ever reached for and actuated or almost actuated the wrong
control then that combination probably constitutes a
problem.) Fatigue, stress or inattention would contribute
to a problem of this sort. Identify any such problems
below.




40. Can you think of any displays which are hard to
interpret during night flight because of bad lighting? If
you find yourself straining to read instruments at night,
lighting guality or quantity could be the problem.
Disregard glare effects - you have a shot at that in the
next question.
DISPLAY PROBLEM SEVER- CRITI-
ITY CALITY

41. During night flight, doss glare on instrument faces or
from glass covers on instruments keep you from clearly
seeing the display? Please identify any problems of this
sort below.




42. Do you have an unobstructed view of all cockpit
displays which you feel you need to see while securely
restrained in your seat as if for takeoff or landing? If
not, please identify the displays which present a problem.
DISPLAY PROBLEM SEVER- CRITI-
ITY CALITY

43. Do you have an unobstructed view of all cockpit
displays which you feel you should be able to see while in
normal flight (not necessarily securely restrained) ? If
not, please identify the displays which present a problem.




44. Do you have any problems interpreting displays due to
parallax problems? (this might involve displays which
require precise interpretation but which are easily
misinterpreted due to the angle from which you are forced to
view them)
DISPLAY PROBLEM SEVER- CRITI-
ITY CALITY

45. Many of the newer aircraft in the Navy inventory use
cathode ray tubes as cockpit displays. Radar and television
displays are the most common form of CRT's. Do you feel
that you have adequate control over CRT brightness and/or
other CRT features? (If it blinds you at night and cannot
be seen in the bright of day you probably have a problem)
Please identify the CRT and problem, if applicable.




One of the first things you learned in the training
command was developement of an effective scan pattern for
monitoring the instrument panel. The scan may vary from
evolution tc evolution depending on the aircraft. The
effectiveness of your scan can be helped or hindered by the
way in which the various instruments are located in relation
to each other, their proximity, relative brightness, etc.
The following questions relate to this area.
46. Are displays grouped such that you are able ro
efficiently scan tnose you consider to be most important?
Note proolem displays below.
DISPLAY PROBLEM SEVER- CHITI-
ITY CALITY

47. Are the displays you feel you need to include in your
scan, illuminated at night such that they are all about








48. Do the displays you feel you need to include in your
scan compete equally for your attention? (Are some displays
much larger than others and, if this is the case, does the
larger one seem to dominate or is the smaller one equally
attention getting?) Note any problems below.
DISPLAY PROBLEM SEVER- CRITI-
ITY CALITY

49. Are ths displays you feel you need to include in your
scan equally easy to interpret such that you are not
required to spend an excessive amount of time on one display
at the expense of others? Note the problem displays, if
any, below.




50. Can you think of any displays which are hard to
interpret because of the confusing way in which the
information is presented? (rather than glancing at this
display and almost immediately getting the information, you
must actually stop and take time to interpret what you see.)
Please comment below on any problems of this type.
DISPLAY PROBLEM SEVER- CBITI-
ITY CALITY

51. Do you find that checking a particular display or
displays tends to be vertigo inducing? If so, please
identify the display and phase of flight.
DISPLAY
CONTROL PROBLEM SEVER- CRITI-
ITY CALITY

52. Is the information your displays give you
sufficiently detailed? (If ycu need to know engine
temperature to the nearest degree or altitude to the nearest
foot, do the displays give you that or must you
interpolate?) Are your displays telling you everything you
need to know cr do they give it to you in pieces and make
you do mental calculations when your mind would be better
off flying the airplane? List below any problem displays
and briefly identify the problem.
DISPLAY PROBLEM SEVER- CRITI-
ITY CALITY

53. The last question was concerned with whether your
displays gave you sufficiently detailed information. This
one looks for the opposite situation. Do you have any
displays which, in your opinion, provide excessively
detailed information when in fact that amount of detail is
not required? Note any problems below.
DISPLAY PROBLEM SEVEE- CEITI-
ITY CALITY

54. Visual warning systems such as fire warning lights,
caution lights, and annunciator panel lights should be very
attention getting. Please note below any warning lights
which you feel are not as attention getting as they should
be and why. (Reasons might be too dim, should flash, wrong
color, not in field of view, etc.)




This section comprises the "cats and dogs" of System
Safety/Human Factors Engineering problems. The last
question in this section gives you the opportunity to speak
your mind on a wide range of topics. Do so.
55. Do you have any comments regarding the seat from which
you operate. Comfort, ease of adjustment, range of
adjustment, harness restraint system, ejection handle design
and accessability, etc., could constitute potential problem
areas. Please note any problems below.
ITEM PROBLEM SEVER- CRITI-
ITY CALITY

IF YOU ABE A PILOT OF A SINGLE-SEAT AIRCRAFT OR IF YOUR
AVIATING DUTIES IN A DUAL PILOTED AIRCRAFT ARE PRIMARILY
LEFT SEATJ SKIP TO QUESTION 60.
This series of four questions involves the design of the
co-pilot or NFO's seat in a side-by-side cockpit
arrangement (A-6, E-2, S-3, P-3 , etc) and the NFO's seat in
aircraft such as the F-4 or F-14. the purpose of the
questions is to determine those critical controls and/or
displays which are not accessable enough or not accessable
at all to you, the co-pilot or NFO, who need them to fulfill
your responsibility of backing-up the pilot.

56. List those controls which you can operate only with
great difficulty (you can get to them, but not very easily)
but which you feel should be more accessable.




57. List those controls which you cannot operate at ail
(you can't get to them at all) but which you feel you should
be abla to operate.
CONTROL PROBLEM SEVER- C3ITI-
ITY CALITY

58. List those displays which you can monitor only with
great difficulty but which you feel should be more easily
monitored.




59. List those displays which you cannot monitor at all
but which you feel you should be able to monitor.




60. The problems of lack of stowage space in the cockpit




61. Aura}, warning systems are sometimes used in place of
or as backups for visual warning systems. Examples are the
tone which goes off when you go below preset radar altimeter
limits and the various ECM warning signals. If ycu are
aware of any problems in this area such as signals being too
weak, not attention getting enough, too loud, etc., please
identify them below.
SYSTEM PROBLEM SEVER- CRITI-
ITY CALITY

62. Do you have sufficient control over floodlight and
peripheral lighting so as to be able to easily adjust the
lights tc a level you find comfortable? Do not consider
instrument and control panel lighting. If, in your opinion,
there are problems, please note below the offending light or
lights and the type problem (too bright, too dim, can't
adjust, bad location, glare, etc.)*
SYSTEM PROBLEM SEVER- CRITI-
I'TY CALITY

63. Do you have sufficient control over the instrument
and console lighting so as to be able to adjust these lights
to a level you deem comfortable? A situation where you had
to live with a bright panel or instrument next to a dim one
might cause a problem. Identify any problems below.
SYSTEM PROBLEM SEVER- C3ITI-
ITY CALITY

64. If you have any general comments on the transition
back and forth between simulators and actual aircraft please
make them in the space below.
123

65. Do you have any comments regarding the environmental
conditions in which you are required to work? Environmental
factors can cause distraction and induce fatigue. They
include such things as temperature, vibration, illumination,
noise, humidity, pollution, etc. If any of these factors
present a significant problem in your cockpit please
identify the problem below.




66. This page and the following one are provided for you
to expound to your hearts content as to your opinion of this
guestionnaire, your view of SS/HFE and its role in your
future, your biggest complaint with regard to Naval Aviation
Safety, etc. In other words you are being asked to unload,





SEVERITY AND CRITICALITY RATING SHEET
You are asked to rate deficiency severity and criticality
numerous times within this questionnaire. The scale ranges
from 1 to 5 with the higher numbers indicating increased
severity and criticality. In order to provide clarification
of the meaning of each rating the following interpretation
is provided:
SEVSRITY-The difficulty the named deficiency presents to the
operator
.
Rating Reaching, seeing, interpreting, ^etc. , this
control or display or performing this act, in
my opinion,
1 is not at all difficult or only slightly so
2 is somewhat difficult
3 is quite difficult
4 is extremely difficult
5 is impossible or nearly so
CRITICALITY- The potential of the named deficiency for
causing an accident or serious incident.
Rating Reaching, seeing, interpreting, etc., this
control or display or performing this act, in
my opinion,
1 has virtually no effect on flight safety
2 has some potential for causing an accident or
serious incident
3 has considerable potential for causing an
accident or serious incident
4 has great potential for causing an accident or
serious incident
5 either already has caused an accident or serious
incident or will cause one in the near future
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